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SAMPLE CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR
WEEK OF 23-30 NOVEMBER
(INFORMATION AS OF 0900 30 NOV)

GENERAL ROUNDUP

Introduction

- I. Mr. Chairman, the two main events of the past week were the coup in Greece on Sunday, and the apparent breaking-off of the Arab-Israeli talks yesterday.
 - A. Elsewhere, the government of South Korea is faced with growing student protests, as well as incursions by the North Korean Navy into its territorial waters.
 - B. In Argentina, the illness of President Peron has raised new doubts about his ability to govern.
 - C. I propose to cover these matters as briefly as possible and then have my colleague, Dr. Angus MacWheelbase, give you a somewhat more detailed assessment of the situation in Indochina. Either of us will, of course, be glad to try to answer any questions you may have.

The Coup in Greece

II. The bloodless coup in Athens early last Sunday is not likely to cause any significant change in Greece's basic attitude toward the United States.

A. The leading members of the new regime have long been considered pro-American, are committed to NATO, and realize they need American diplomatic and--possibly--economic support.

III. The country is quiet. The coup leaders seem to have full backing from the armed forces and are reportedly purging any doubtful elements.

A. All public services, private enterprises and educational institutions--except universities--are again operating normally. In a bid for popular support, the new government is releasing most of the students arrested during the recent demonstrations.

B. All curfews were also quickly lifted; troops and tanks were withdrawn from Athens within a few days.

C. Most Greeks are glad that Papadopoulos is gone, but this euphoria will probably soon

give way to a wait-and-see attitude.

IV. The moving force behind the coup was Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis (E-O-Knee-Dees), chief of military police. He apparently picked the new President, Prime Minister, and Cabinet, few of whom are prominent or even well-known.

A. Most are civilians. These civilians serve as window-dressing, and also negate one of the criticisms the purist group had of the Papadopoulos regime--that inclusion of the military in the government led to corruption of the revolution.

V. Ioannidis has long been high on the list of potential challengers to Papadopoulos, who ran the risk of a coup at every step of his campaign toward a personally guided democracy. Ioannidis' control of the police network put him in a position to make or break any coup. Sunday morning he chose to make one.

A. Ioannidis and certain other revolutionary officers who helped Papadopoulos to power had come to have two basic fears about him.

1. They thought he was more interested in self-aggrandizement than in the purist goals of the revolution.
2. Secondly, they feared his policy of liberalization and democratization would place the revolution in the hands of its pre-1967 political enemies and reintroduce leftist-inspired political chaos.
3. The corruption of some of Papadopoulos's appointees and the recent student-worker demonstrations appear to have confirmed these fears.

B. Ioannidis is a staunch, puritanical nationalist with definite views about what the content of Greek politics, culture, social life, and morals should be.

VI. In a radio-TV address on Wednesday, the new prime minister promised that his government would draft a new constitution and lead the country to democratic rule.

A. He held out little hope for any early moves in this direction, however, and any elections

are likely to be a long way off.

- B. The regime will likely focus its efforts on consolidating its power, and factionalism and a power struggle could develop.
- C. Furthermore, the new "junta" will have to face the same problems that badgered Papadopoulos--freedom, order, economic stability, and growth. It certainly has no better people with which to do this, and may take a simplistic military approach that will lead to polarization, violence--and repression.
 - 1. The present worsening economic crisis and popular discontent will furnish a quick test of how--and where--the regime will move.

VII. Given its commitment to NATO and the need for American support, no drastic revisions of the homeporting agreement are likely.

- A. There may be some tendency, however, to demand a lower profile by the US Navy, as well as some stickiness on various minor aspects of the agreement. Such actions would be aimed at public opinion, since open anti-

Americanism became apparent during the latest disturbances.

B. Also, the new leaders are probably irritated at American pressures in behalf of liberalization and democratization, and may become difficult in matters of secondary importance between the two countries.

The Arab-Israeli Talks

VIII. As for the Middle East, Mr. Chairman, the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement talks at Kilometer 101 were "broken off" yesterday. They had apparently been at an impasse for some time. The Egyptians say Israel is merely stalling movement toward any withdrawal, and the UN negotiators on the scene have come to agree with Cairo.

IX. Nevertheless, some progress had been made.

A. Israel first demanded that each party withdraw to opposite sides of the Canal. This would amount to a return to the pre-war situation, with the addition of UN patrols a few miles deep on each bank.

1. The Israelis have now backed off significantly from this position, and are

concentrating on defining their own withdrawal--with conditions.

B. Egypt also began with a wide-ranging proposal that Israeli forces withdraw deep into Sinai, well beyond the passes and well beyond Sharm ash-Shaykh.

1. Egypt, too, has considerably lowered its sights for this first round of disengagement.

X. There are still significant differences, however.

A. Egypt wants Israeli forces withdrawn east of the strategic Sinai passes; Israel wants to retain the passes, with only a 10-15 kilometer withdrawal east of the Canal.

1. This appears to be the least serious aspect of the deadlock. Each side has indicated some flexibility on the depth of withdrawal, and agreement could be reached if more serious obstacles were removed.

B. Egypt wants to position three infantry divisions--with tanks--on the east bank, and has a complex formula for separating the main

forces of each side by a series of zones.

Beyond the main Egyptian force, for instance, areas would be designated for lightly armed Egyptian forces, then a UN force, and then a lightly armed Israeli force--all to be positioned west of the main Israeli force.

Israel, on the other hand, apparently is calling for the complete removal of the Egyptian Army from the east bank, leaving only "policing" forces in the area Egypt would control.

1. Again, the two sides are not irreconcilably separated on this issue. The Egyptians have indicated a willingness to consider a further thinning of their forces to accommodate Israeli requirements.

C. Finally, the basic and most serious disagreements center not so much on substance as on different perceptions of the need for, and the timing of, tangible movement toward disengagement.

1. Israel would clearly prefer to postpone for as long as possible any moves toward withdrawal--both for reasons of domestic politics and simply because of the irrevocable pattern even the first step, let alone succeeding ones, would create.
2. Egypt, by contrast, takes the view that it is incumbent on the Israelis to undertake some actual moves toward separating forces in advance of the peace conference, rather than simply to talk about withdrawal. The apparent tendency of Israel's military negotiator to make off-the-cuff proposals of a fairly forthcoming nature--which Tel Aviv does not back up--has confirmed the Egyptian belief that the Israelis are merely delaying.

XI. The two sides are thus not far apart on substantive issues, and probably not far apart on their realization that an Israeli withdrawal is in the cards. Their divergent views on the urgency of that withdrawal are the crux of the problem, and

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could deadlock the cease-fire talks and ultimately threaten the cease-fire itself.

- A. Both the Arabs and the Israelis are at maximum readiness to renew fighting.
- B. The Israelis clearly fear that another Egyptian attack is not far off. They claim that the armored concentrations poised against Israel's west bank salient remain in place, the Egyptian losses have been effectively made up, and that large amounts of arms and equipment have been moved to the Suez front.
- C. We agree with the facts of this Israeli assessment, but believe that much of the Egyptian activity may, in turn, be a precaution against possible Israeli attack.
- D. In any case, renewed military activity would not promise any easy success for either side.
 - 1. The high state of readiness makes a pre-emptive attack almost impossible, and would give the defenders a distinct advantage.
 - 2. A renewal of the fighting under these

circumstances would produce high casualties on both sides.

The Arab Summit

XII. Let me mention the Arab summit conference that ended on Wednesday. It was a fairly predictable and pro forma performance, but did air serious differences between Jordan and the fedayeen over the question of representation of the Palestinians in future negotiations.

XIII. Sadat had laid the groundwork for the conference well before it got under way, in an effort to steer it along a moderate course.

A. He then set out to gain a vote of confidence in his decision to negotiate a peace with Israel, as well as a show of Arab solidarity and firmness in the face of those negotiations. He largely succeeded.

B. The Egyptians believe they have the majority, and the important majority, of the Arabs behind them for negotiations. At the same time, public statements by Sadat and Asad warned Israel that the danger of war is not over

until there is an acceptable peace.

XIV. There was serious disagreement over Jordan's differences with the fedayeen.

- A. King Husayn stayed away to keep from confronting Yasir Arafat directly on the issue of fedayeen representation at the peace conference. The King sent a proxy, however, to say that Jordan would not attend the peace conference if Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization were named the "sole legitimate" representative of the Palestine people.
- B. At the conference, however, Arafat backed away from any plans he may have had for announcing the formation of a Palestinian government-in-exile, and for demanding the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Jordan's West Bank.
- C. Fedayeen silence on these issues may have eased Husayn's dilemma considerably.
 - 1. Husayn's claim to sovereignty over the West Bank was not disputed, and he has no shadow government to compete with.

2. Moreover, although the summit did accord the PLO the role of sole negotiator for Palestine, Arafat himself admitted in a newspaper interview yesterday that he has to be invited to the peace conference before he can represent anything. An invitation simply may never arrive.

The Oil Situation

XV. Sadat also extracted a firm but tempered statement from the conference concerning the use of oil as a weapon. He undoubtedly coordinated this move with King Faysal.

A. The heads of state agreed to put Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia on the total embargo list, along with the charter members, the US and Holland.

B. At the same time, they announced that recent pro-Arab positions adopted by Japan and the Philippines would exempt them from the 5 percent cutbacks scheduled for December. The European Economic Community had previously been exempted.

- C. Countries not classed as "friendly" to the Arabs--but not actively supporting Israel--such as Canada, West Germany, and Italy, get whatever Arab oil is left after deliveries to the "friendly" countries. This share is steadily shrinking.
- D. The Arab states are relatively invulnerable to short-term economic countermeasures. Only about 10 percent of their imports came from the United States, and 60 percent from elsewhere in the industrialized West. Other sources are available for their small essential needs.
 1. Grain needs, for instance, could easily be met by the USSR, Latin America, New Zealand, and Australia.
 2. The major Arab petroleum producers depend on the United States, Western Europe, and Japan for 80 percent of their machinery and equipment imports, but could probably get essentials from other countries.
 3. Even if Arab assets were frozen, some

\$4.5 billion per year from oil exports to countries other than the US, Western Europe, and Japan would still be available.

Korea

XVI. In South Korea, student unrest has the government concerned, and its countermeasures so far have not been effective.

- A. On Wednesday, for instance, students at a major women's university tried to march through the streets, but were dispersed by police using tear gas. Later, some 3,000 of the students staged a sitdown strike at the university.
- B. The next day, there were clashes between police and students at three major universities, but no serious confrontations.
- C. The government should be able to cope with the situation so long as the security forces do not make matters worse by heavy-handed tactics.

XVII. Incursions into South Korean territorial waters this week by North Korean naval vessels have

created a more serious problem.

- A. The trouble began about a month ago, when North Korean naval units started crossing the so called Northern Limit Line--which you can see on this map.
 - 1. This line was unilaterally established by the US in 1964, to prevent South Korean ships from intruding into North Korean waters.
 - 2. The line has no legal or official basis, but North Korea has generally refrained from sending its naval forces south of the line.
- B. During the last month, however, crossings of the line have become increasingly frequent. On Wednesday matters came to a head when at least four North Korean gunboats not only crossed the line, but penetrated waters contiguous to islands under jurisdiction of the United Nations Command, just south of the line.
- C. This action nearly resulted in a clash when the gunboats were challenged by South Korean

naval units that had orders to fire if the North Koreans did not leave the area which Seoul claims as territorial waters.

1. Aircraft on both sides were scrambled, but flew only defensive patrols.

D. Pyongyang must be aware that it is risking a serious military incident by this activity. It may even be seeking one that could be blamed on Seoul.

E. Wednesday's incursion was near Sochong-do island--one of five island groups you see on this map just south of the Northern Limit Line.

1. As I have said, these islands are formally under UN control, according to the 1953 armistice. Seoul, however, maintains a military presence on them. North Korea--anticipating that the UN command will be dissolved in the next year or so--may wish to demonstrate its ability to control these islands, or at least challenge the legitimacy of the South Korean military presence.

Argentina


XVIII. Let me conclude this brief wrapup of the week's developments with a glance at the prospects for Argentina following President Peron's illness.

A. His "heart attack" on November 21 was actually a congestive heart failure, not an out and out cardiac attack.

B. His doctors have been publicly optimistic regarding his chances for recovery-

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2. Furthermore, Peron had been far from well and working a reduced schedule even before the November "attack."

C. This latest setback will, at the least, curtail his personal "diplomatic offensive," which was to have included a trip to the US in early December. Many--especially the military--believe his activity may be much more restricted, and they have come to have new doubts about his ability to govern the country.

XIX. Under the constitution, Peron's wife--who is vice president--would succeed him if he dies or is incapacitated for an extended period.

A. She has been performing diplomatic duties, and, during his convalescence, has had some limited executive authority.

1. She has shown few political talents, however, and has little support within the Peronist movement.

B. She would need the backing of the military in order to govern--and, according to a report just received, the military leaders have decided to support her if she does, in fact, become president.

1. They are said to have agreed that there are no acceptable alternatives, and they believe they can control her.

2. Furthermore, since her succession would be constitutional, new elections--which the officers fear would bring a leftist to power--would not be necessary.

C. The left wing of the Peronist coalition and various revolutionary groups would not tolerate

this arrangement for long, however, and a violent struggle for power could well result.

1. The military leaders know that the armed forces' popularity hit rock bottom under past military governments, and they do not want to intervene openly in politics.
2. Extensive disorders or bloodshed, however, could lead the military to see themselves as the only guarantors of security and political stability.

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INDOCHINA

I. Mr. Chairman, the Middle East crisis has probably drawn your attention away from developments in other areas of the world where US interests are involved. One of these is Indochina, where fighting is continuing in both South Vietnam and Cambodia. Furthermore, the political situation in Phnom Penh is fragile, to say the least.

A. This morning I would like to review for you the status of military activity in these countries, the prospects for an escalation of hostilities, and--very briefly--the political situation in the Cambodian capital.

Vietnam

II. The dry season--which is also the best fighting season--has begun in most of South Vietnam. Consequently, the intelligence community's attention is focused on the question of Hanoi's intentions between now and the beginning of the rains late next spring.

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- A. There is an honest difference of opinion within the intelligence community on this question, and I will discuss the pros and cons in due time.
- B. Analysts have generally agreed, however, that-- whatever the longer term possibilities--we should expect a sharp expansion in military activity in South Vietnam between now and the end of this year.

III. The fighting has, in fact, already become heavier in many parts of South Vietnam. The most significant action has been in western Military Region 2, and the provinces north of Saigon.

- A. In MR-2, one ARVN division is being moved south from the highlands to Quang Duc Province, where the government recently lost three outposts.
 - 1. Saigon's efforts have already had some success; Dak Song, one of the three posts, was retaken on 28 November.
 - 2. The North Vietnamese are well dug in, however, and any further government advances are likely to be hard won.

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3. To fill the gap in the highlands caused by this move, Saigon plans to bring another regiment up from Binh Dinh Province.

a. This shift obviously involves a gamble that Communist forces will be unable to capitalize on the reduced ARVN presence in Binh Dinh. The odds probably favor the government, as the Communists have been fairly quiet in this area for some time.

B. North of Saigon, government commanders are expecting new Communist attacks, but they are also planning aggressive spoiling operations of their own.

1. Isolated provincial capitals in northern MR-3 or southern MR-2 are believed to be the most likely targets for Communist attacks.

2. In fact, two North Vietnamese infantry regiments have recently been detected near the Phuoc Long provincial capital, which is now dependent on air resupply.

3. On the government side, South Vietnamese aircraft have been striking hard at Communist base areas near the Cambodian border. Preparations for more extensive ground actions are also underway.
4. The Communists seem generally aware of the government's plans. Viet Cong officials in Tay Ninh Province, for instance, were warned early this month to expect large-scale operations in late November or early December. They were told these would begin with air strikes against Communist base areas.

C. Other parts of the country have also seen increased fighting in the last few weeks.

1. There have been a number of incidents in the delta, where the Communists are struggling for better access to the rice harvest.
2. Action has also stepped up in northern South Vietnam--particularly in southern MR-1--as the heavy floods of the past couple of weeks have receded.

IV. None of this activity, however, gives much addi-

tional insight into the larger question of Communist intentions in the first part of next year.

A. The Communists have--as this chart shows--more troops and far more firepower in the South than they had at the beginning of the 1972 offensive. Even so, they still need a substantial supply of infiltrators to flesh out some units and establish reserve pools.

1.



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B. There has been a spate of reports from South Vietnam that predict an offensive early next year, although most of our better sources are still silent on the question.

C. Thus, although there probably will be a further increase in the kind of military give-and-take that we have seen in the past few weeks, it is still an open question whether Hanoi is planning major offensive action later in the dry season.

V. Let me review the pros and cons of this question since, as I mentioned at the outset, it is one on which the intelligence community has not been able to agree. (The "intelligence community," by the way, consists of CIA, DIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the intelligence arms of the various services, the Atomic Energy Commission, NSA, the FBI, and the Treasury Department.)

A. This time the question is more difficult to grapple with because the factors involved are very different--and more complicated--than those in previous dry seasons.

1. As a result of the Paris accords, direct US military involvement in the war is at an end.

2. In addition, the Communists for the first time have a firm grip on extensive stretches of South Vietnamese territory.
 - a. Much of what they hold is thinly populated and economically marginal, but it does give them a reasonably secure base for either military or political action.
 - b. Moreover--as I have already pointed out--they are steadily strengthening that base. As a result, we estimate that by the end of the present dry season the military balance, which presently favors Saigon by a narrow margin, may shift in Hanoi's favor.
- B. At the same time, some trends that began earlier have continued.
 1. The most notable of these is the steadily increasing solidity of the Thieu government's position.
 - a. Thieu may not be broadly popular in a Western sense, but the effectiveness of his government's writ is undeniable.

b. Moreover, popular or not, he has achieved a broad measure of respect, and his regime is widely regarded as far preferable to a Communist one.

C. Another factor entering into Hanoi's calculations--and one less easy for us to calculate--is its relations with its patrons in Moscow and Peking.

1. The North Vietnamese probably would not have signed the Paris agreement without Soviet and Chinese prodding, and both capitals have made it clear that they do not favor military adventures by Hanoi that might jeopardize their relations with the US.

2. The difficult question is the extent to which their pressure has inhibited Hanoi's plans for this dry season.

VI. This is the context in which Hanoi views its options during the current dry season: a military position that is strong and growing stronger, a political position that is highly unsatisfactory and likely to remain so, and a big-power milieu

that differs significantly from what Hanoi has faced in earlier years.

- A. We assume that Hanoi's intention to gain control over the South, by military force if necessary, remains unchanged.
- B. Given this intention and the situation confronting the North Vietnamese in the South, another offensive is likely at some point; the only question is when.
- C. Weighing these factors, some analysts think major military action is likely next spring.
 - 1. They point to the massive Communist materiel buildup and to the fact that there are now more Communist troops in South Vietnam than there were at the beginning of the 1972 offensive.
 - 2. They believe Hanoi may now regard the possibility of US military involvement as fairly small.
 - 3. And finally, they estimate that Hanoi thinks its chances of political success will decline over time and it must exercise its military option sooner rather than later.

D. Other analysts believe an offensive will be postponed to another dry season.

1. These analysts think a number of inhibitions are still operating on Hanoi--including a residual fear of US bombing and uncertainties about Chinese and Soviet support.
2. They believe the North Vietnamese will be inclined to keep working at improving their military position inside South Vietnam, and also that they will not give up so early on the effort to strengthen their political apparatus in the South.
3. Finally, these analysts point to the continuing absence of the classical indicators of an offensive--notably large-scale troop infiltration to South Vietnam.

VII. About the only place in the Vietnam picture where practically nothing seems to be going on is Paris.

A. The Communists are still making occasional efforts to ally themselves with potential "third-force" leaders, but they do not seem to be trying very hard.

- B. And neither Saigon nor the Communists give any sign that they expect anything from the formal talks between them.
- C. In the meantime, we expect that, at a minimum, the present increased level of fighting will continue through the rest of the year. It may not reach the point of a major offensive, but it will, at times, be sharp and bloody--especially in the northern part of South Vietnam.
- D. Hanoi may believe that US and Soviet preoccupation with the Middle East, and the US domestic situation, present an opportunity for mounting even heavier attacks than it was already planning.

Cambodia

VIII. As for Cambodia, Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community has just made an assessment of the prospects for military action and political stability through the current dry season--that is, through May of next year.

- A. We believe that the Khmer Communists are likely to follow a strategy which calls for

the interdiction of Phnom Penh's key lines of communication, attacks against the city's outlying defenses, and attacks elsewhere. The goal of this strangulation strategy is to create pressures, physical and psychological, that will lead to the collapse or capitulation of the present government.

1. A direct all-out assault on Phnom Penh this dry season has some appeal to the KC, and might occur later in the dry season.
- B. We also believe--although it is a very close call--that the Lon Nol government will survive the coming round of military action. The major factors will be the relative staying power of the insurgents and Phnom Penh and the availability of support from their prime allies--Hanoi and Washington.
- C. Prospects for a negotiated settlement do not appear good until the insurgents have made an effort to win it all militarily this dry season. But only the Khmer Communists are

adamantly opposed to negotiations.

1. Sihanouk, Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow apparently all prefer a negotiated settlement, as do some elements in Phnom Penh.
2. Thus, the Khmer Communists might be more willing to consider a negotiated settlement if they fail to topple the Lon Nol government this dry season.

IX. During this week, the Khmer Communists appeared determined to press their dry season strategy by choking off Phnom Penh's major supply arteries. They were doing this despite late and heavy rains that have made military operations particularly difficult.

A. The Communists are still interdicting the two remaining overland routes to the capital.

1. Route 4, connecting Phnom Penh with the seaport at Kompong Som, has been cut since November 11. Government clearing operations are making little headway.
2. Route 5, leading to the rice-producing northwest, has been closed since September 6, and the government does not plan

to try to reopen it until early next year.

3. This leaves the Mekong River as Phnom Penh's primary lifeline. The Communists are increasing their attacks on resupply convoys along the river, although the continuing high water is hampering their efforts. A 13-ship government supply convoy, for instance, was ambushed on the river early this week--but only one small vessel was lost.
- B. In the immediate Phnom Penh area, flooded terrain is serving to curb military activity by both sides.

x. The political situation in Phnom Penh is relatively tranquil at the moment.

- A. Prime Minister In Tam probably will try again to resign, once the Khmer representation issue at the UN is resolved.
 1. Debate on the issue opens next week, and the latest tally indicates Phnom Penh is likely to lose its seat to Sihanouk if a vote is taken.

B. The effectiveness of the government, however, is still undermined by bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and Lon Nol's unwillingness to delegate much real authority--even to the other members of the High Political Council or the prime minister.

1. As a result of these tensions, another government crisis could burst out with little or no warning.

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his copy w/ Colby's
note on it)

(DATE)

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1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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